Michael A. McGill, SBN 231613 1 mcgill@policeattorney.com 2 Russell M. Perry. SBN 246252 FILED CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT 3 russell@policeattorney.com LACKIE, DAMMEIER & MCGILL APC 4 MAY 2 3 2011 367 North Second Avenue 5 Upland, CA 91786 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Telephone: (909) 985-4003 6 Facsimile: (909) 985-3299 7 8 Attorneys for Plaintiffs, CHRISTOPHER CRAIG, ABRAHAM AGUAYO, 9 and JAIME ANDRADE 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 CHRISTOPHER CRAIG, ABRAHAM Case Boy 11-043996HK(AGPX) 13 AGUAYO, and JAIME ANDRADE. 14 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: 15 Plaintiffs. 1. Violation of Civil Rights, 42 16 VS. U.S.C. § 1983 2. Violation of 42 U.S.C. §12112(a), 17 CITY OF KING CITY, a municipal Discrimination based on regarded as disability. corporation; NICK BALDIVIEZ, 18 3. Violation of 42 U.S.C. §12203 individually and as Chief of Police for Retaliation for opposing 19 unlawful practice. the King City Police Department; 4. Violation of 42 U.S.C. 20 MICHAEL POWERS, individually and §12112(d)(4)(A) Unlawful Order as City Manager for the King City: for Fitness FFDE 5. Violation of MMBA, CA Gov't Code §§3502, 3506; CCP §1085
6. Violation of POBOR, CA Gov't Code §§3302; 3309.5.
7. Violation of CMIA, CA Civil Code §§56.35; 56.36 21 MARK BAKER, individually and as 22 Sergeant for the King City Police Department: JERRY HUNTER 23 individually and as "acting" Sergeant 24 for the King City Police Department; 8. Violation of CMIA, CA Civil Code §56.20. MYRNA GLICK individually, and as 25 9. Violation of Robbins-Rosenthal an agent for King City; THE FDCPA, CA Civil Code §§ 1788, 26 et seq. 10. Violation of FDCPA,15 U.S.C. STEWART, LLC, dba Aaron's Sales 27 and Lease; and DOES 1 THROUGH \$1692. 10 INCLUSIVE, 28 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Defendants.

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

F.R. Civ. P. Rule 38; C.D. LR 38-11

2 3

4 5 6

7 8

9 10

1213

11

15 16

14

1718

19

20

21 22

23

2425

26

27

28

I.

PREFATORY

1. This is an action for damages and injunctive relief for personal injury suffered by the Plaintiffs as a result of wrongful retaliation for the lawful exercise of individual civil rights and liberties of free expression and participation in labor, union, and political activities. Defendants also violated various state and federal laws.

II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. Plaintiffs action is authorized by 42 U.S.C. §1983, which provides for redress for the deprivation under color of state law of rights secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. Plaintiffs also bring this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101, et seq. ("ADA") and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §1343(3), providing for jurisdiction in this Court of suits authorized by 42 U.S.C. §1983 to redress the deprivation under color of state law of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, and by 28 U.S.C. §1343(4), providing for the protection of civil rights, and by 28 U.S.C. §1331, which gives district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. Federal supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §1367. This Court has authority to provide declaratory and injunctive relief in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202. Venue is proper in the Central District of California pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1391(b), as one of the named defendants resides within the Central District.

III.

PARTIES

- 3. Plaintiff CHRIS CRAIG was, at all times relevant to this claim unless otherwise mentioned herein, employed by Defendant CITY OF KING CITY in the capacity of Police Officer with the King City Police Department, and as such is entitled to the benefits and protections of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights ("POBOR") Act, Government Code section 3300 et seq. Plaintiff's home address is confidential under Penal Code §§146(e) and 832.7, and Vehicle Code §1808.4(a)(11).
- 4. Plaintiff ABRAHAM AGUAYO was, at all times relevant to this claim unless otherwise mentioned herein, employed by Defendant CITY OF KING CITY in the capacity of Police Officer with the King City Police Department, and as such is entitled to the benefits and protections of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights ("POBOR") Act, Government Code section 3300 et seq. Plaintiff's home address is confidential under Penal Code §§146(e) and 832.7, and Vehicle Code §1808.4(a)(11).
- 5. Plaintiff JAIME ANDRADE was, at all times relevant to this claim unless otherwise mentioned herein, employed by Defendant CITY OF KING CITY in the capacity of Police Officer with the King City Police Department, and as such is entitled to the benefits and protections of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights ("POBOR") Act, Government Code section 3300 et seq. Plaintiff's home address is confidential under Penal Code §§146(e) and 832.7, and Vehicle Code §1808.4(a)(11).
- 6. Defendant CITY OF KING CITY ("the City") is a duly constituted municipal corporation operating under the laws of the State of California, wholly situated in the County of Monterey. The King City Police Department ("the Department") is an operating department of the City. At all times relevant herein for all purposes connected with the management of

employment relations matters within the King City Police Department, the City delegated its final policy-making authority to Defendant BALDIVIEZ and Defendant POWERS. City adopted and ratified each of his decisions as alleged herein as its own policies, customs, practices or decisions, as if the same had been promulgated directly by the City. Defendant CITY OF KING CITY is a covered entity for the purposes of the ADA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §12111.

- 7. Defendant NICK BALDIVIEZ ("BALDIVIEZ") was, at all times relevant to this action, except as otherwise mentioned, the Chief of Police for the King City Police Department. In doing the things alleged herein, BALDIVIEZ acted under color of state law, within the course and scope of his employment, and as an official policy-maker for the City. As a Department Head, BALDIVIEZ was vested with policy-making authority over actions such as the ones at issue in this complaint.
- 8. Defendant MICHAEL POWERS ("POWERS") was, at all times relevant to this action, except as otherwise mentioned, the City Manager for King City. In doing the things alleged herein, POWERS acted under color of state law, within the course and scope of his employment, and as an official policy-maker for the City. As a City Manager, POWERS was vested with policy-making authority over actions such as the ones at issue in this complaint.
- 9. Defendant MARK BAKER ("BAKER") was, at all times relevant to this action, except as otherwise mentioned, Sergeant for the King City Police Department. In doing the things alleged herein, BAKER acted under color of state law, within the course and scope of his employment, and as an official policymaker for the City.
- 10. Defendant JERRY HUNTER ("HUNTER") was, at all times relevant to this action, except as otherwise mentioned, acting Sergeant for the King City Police Department. In doing the things alleged herein, HUNTER acted under color

of state law, within the course and scope of his employment, and as an official policy-maker for the City.

- 11. Defendant MYRNA GLICK ("GLICK") may be considered an employee of the City, as, at all times she acted as a servant and agent of the City. She was employed/authorized by the City to conduct a fitness for duty examination ("FFDE") of Plaintiff, CRAIG. In doing the things alleged herein, GLICK acted under color of state law, within the course and scope of her employment, as a servant and agent of the City.
- 12. Defendant, THE STEWART, LLC, dba Aaron's Sales and Lease ("STEWART"), is a leasing company that conducts business at 1557 North Sanborn Rd, Salinas, CA, 93905. Leticia Diaz is the general manager for STEWART and is authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of STEWART. Leticia Diaz acted in the course and scope of said agency, service and employment with STEWART at all relevant times
- 13. Defendant DOES 1 through 10 are not known or identified at this time. On information and belief, Plaintiffs alleges that each Doe is in some manner responsible for the wrongs alleged herein, and that each such Defendant advised, encouraged, participated in, ratified, directed, or conspired to do, the wrongful acts alleged herein. When the true names and capacities of said Defendants become known, Plaintiffs will seek relief to amend this Complaint to show their true identities in place of their fictitious names as DOES 1 through 10.

IV.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

14. In or about March 2005, Plaintiff CHRIS CRAIG was hired by King City as a Police Officer. While at all times employed by the Department, Plaintiff performed his duties competently and without difficulty.

- 15. In or about January 2007, Plaintiff ABRAHAM AGUYAO was hired by King City as a Police Officer. While at all times employed by the Department, Plaintiff performed his duties competently and without difficulty.
- 16. In or about November 2007, Plaintiff JAIME ANDRADE was hired by King City as a Police Officer. While at all times employed by the Department, Plaintiff performed his duties competently and without difficulty.

Plaintiffs Protected Activities

- 17. In or about April 3, 2010, Plaintiff CRAIG was elected President of the King City Police Officer's Association ("the Association" or "POA"). Since that time, Plaintiff CRAIG has actively taken part in numerous speech, labor, and political activities in his capacity as President of the Association, and as a general member.
- 18. In or about April 3, 2010, Plaintiff ANDRADE was elected Treasurer of the King City Police Officer's Association. Since that time, Plaintiff ANDRADE has actively taken part in numerous speech, labor, and political activities in his capacity as Treasurer of the Association, and as a general member.
- 19. In or about August 2010, Plaintiff AGUAYO was elected Vice President of the King City Police Officer's Association. Plaintiff AGUAYO has actively taken part in numerous speech, labor, and political activities in his capacity as Vice President of the Association, and as a general member prior to his election to Vice President.
- 20. In or about July 30, 2010, in his capacity as POA President, Plaintiff CRAIG wrote a memorandum to Defendant, POWERS, indicating that the King City POA gave Defendant, Chief BALDIVIEZ, a vote of 'no confidence.' The memorandum was circulated to all the King City POA members for approval prior to the vote. Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO all voted in favor of the 'no confidence' memorandum. The vote was based on numerous incidents that occurred over an 18 month period. Information contained in the memorandum was

4 5

3

8

9

6

10 11

13

12

14 15

16

17

18 19

20

21

22 23

24

25

26 27

28

newspapers. According to the July 30, 2010 memorandum, the King City POA was 21.

ultimately broadcasted to the public by local TV stations and printed in local

- concerned that a probationary officer was released from the job for reasons other than performance and Defendant BALDIVIEZ' selection of the replacement officer occurred under suspicious circumstances. Specifically, Defendant BALDIVIEZ did not notify all the senior reserve officers that a position was available and instead, unilaterally appointed a reserve officer of his choice almost immediately following the release of the probationary employee. The probationary officer was released on Sunday, July 25, 2010 and the reserve officer began working as a full time officer on Monday, July 26, 2010. The normal process for promoting a reserve officer was not followed by Defendant BALDIVIEZ. Furthermore, the probationary officer appeared to be a very good officer and in fact, just before his release from probation, he had located and arrested a shooting suspect. The King City POA members and Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO were concerned about Defendant Baldiviez' motives for releasing the probationary officer and appointing the new officer.
- 22. Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO were also concerned that Defendant BALDIVIEZ discriminated against officers who may have been (or were perceived to be) overweight in violation of the ADA. The state and federal laws are designed to protect employees from discrimination and harassment based on actual or perceived physical disabilities.
- 23. Plaintiffs CRAIG and ANDRADE were required to participate in the weight loss program under threat of termination by Defendant BALDIVIEZ. They were forced to participate in the program despite the fact that a medical doctor reported to Defendant BALDIVIEZ that CRAIG and ANDRADE were fit for duty. When CRAIG later spoke with Defendant BALDIVIEZ, Defendant BALDIVIEZ responded, "You are fit to exercise." Based on information and belief, private

information about CRAIG and ANDRADE was released to King City by the medical doctor that completed the initial examinations.

- 24. Plaintiff CRAIG was placed on a weight loss program and ordered to lose at least eight pounds a month. One month CRAIG did not make the weight loss as dictated by Defendant BALDIVIEZ and he was given a letter of discussion.
- 25. Despite the Defendants perception that CRAIG was overweight, he demonstrated that he was fit to work as a police officer. On one occasion, CRAIG successfully jumped approximately ten six foot fences with his patrol rifle to clear residential back yards for a shooting suspect. Nevertheless, he was still kept on the weight loss program. Capt. Bruce Miller asked the City Manager, Defendant POWERS, if CRAIG was going to be kept on the weight loss program even though he had performed his duties by jumping so many fences and Defendant POWERS responded that CRAIG was going to stay on the weight loss program because public perception was that CRAIG was overweight. A couple of months later, when a "fit" officer went out on medical for a month for a heart condition, CRAIG informed Chief Baldiviez he was seeking legal counsel regarding the weight loss program.
- 26. Plaintiff CRAIG told Defendant BALDIVIEZ that the mandated weight loss program violated state and federal laws. After Plaintiff CRAIG reported the law violations to Defendant BALDIVIEZ and indicated that the officers in the weight loss program, including Plaintiff ANDRADE, were going to seek legal counsel, the mandated weight loss program, quickly ceased.
- 27. In March of 2011, Plaintiffs CRAIG and ANDRADE requested and received copies of their personnel files and all the documents referencing the weight loss program were removed. Based on information and belief, Defendants POWERS and BALDIVIEZ destroyed the records related to the weight loss program in order to hide their illegal acts.

- 28. Plaintiffs CRAIG and ANDRADE were subjected to adverse employment actions in retaliation for reporting the law violations to Defendant BALDIVIEZ.
- 29. Furthermore, Plaintiffs CRAIG, AGUAYO, and ANDRADE, have been subjected to adverse employment actions in retaliation for their collective report of the above law violations in the July 30, 2010 vote of no confidence memo.
- 30. Via the July 30, 2010 vote of 'no confidence' against Defendant BALDIVIEZ, Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO also expressed their concern about Defendant BALDIVIEZ arriving to crime scenes intoxicated.
- 31. According to the July 30, 2010 memorandum, Defendant BALDIVIEZ arrived at crimes scenes intoxicated. One of the incidents occurred on Beech Street. Defendant BALDIVIEZ showed up to a shooting and he appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. A strong odor of alcohol emitted from his breath, and his eyes were red and watery. Defendant POWERS was also present with Defendant BALDIVIEZ. An on-scene Sergeant was notified and he notified the on-scene Captain.
- 32. On or about March 3, 2010, Defendant BALDIVIEZ showed up to another shooting and he appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. A strong odor of alcohol emitted from his vehicle. A strong odor of alcohol emitted from his breath, and his eyes were red and watery. Defendant BALDIVIEZ took it upon himself to aggressively interview one of the witnesses. He stepped in blood at the crime scene and yelled at witnesses. Once again, an on-scene Sergeant was notified.
- 33. Defendant POWERS stated to the King City Police Officers at a briefing that if anyone says anything bad about Defendant BALDIVIEZ he (POWERS) is going to take it personal. Defendant POWERS stated he would fire employees for saying anything bad about Defendant BALDIVIEZ.

- 34. On August 4, 2010, Plaintiff CRAIG wrote a memo on behalf of the King City POA to Defendant POWERS that they were standing firm with the prior vote of no confidence in the Chief.
- 36. On August 9, 2010, Plaintiff CRAIG wrote a memo on behalf of the King City POA to Defendant POWERS objecting to the fact that Defendant POWERS was going to conduct the Internal Affairs investigation of Defendant BALDIVIEZ. In the memorandum, Claimant CRAIG reported that Defendant POWERS said he would take it personal if anyone says anything bad about Defendant BALDIVIEZ. Defendant POWERS stated he would fire employees for saying anything bad about Defendant BALDIVIEZ. Defendant POWERS also made false comments to the media, accusing the King City POA of exploiting the issue because they were in contract negotiations. Finally, the King City POA believed that it was inappropriate for Defendant POWERS to conduct the Internal Affair investigation because he was a witness to at least one of the incidents where Defendant BALDIVIEZ allegedly arrived at a crime scene intoxicated.
- 37. On August 19, 2010, the City Attorney, Roy Hanley, wrote Plaintiff CRAIG a critical response and questioned his motives for the vote of no confidence. Mr. Hanley stated that, "[i]t is rumored that the vote was with only five members present, with only three voting in favor." The letter went on to state, "[i]f you were just seeking impartial justice, you would not have issued a press release and appeared on television in an apparent effort to get the chief fired. Those are the actions of persons who want a predetermined result. Those are not the actions of someone or an organization that is only seeking impartial justice." This letter was cc'd to Defendant POWERS and the City Council. It's no coincidence that all three King City POA Board members that voted in favor of the vote of no confidence against Defendant BALDIVIEZ found themselves to be the subject of internal affairs investigations within eleven days of Defendant BALDIVIEZ' return to work, following administrative leave. Based on information and belief, Defendant

BALDIVIEZ also stated that he had "something in the works" for the person (or persons) responsible for exposing his misconduct.

Retaliation, Discrimination, Harassment

- 38. On September 14, 2010, Defendant BALDIVIEZ returned to work following the internal investigation and administrative leave.
- 39. The very next day (September 15, 2010) Defendant BALDIVIEZ authorized an internal affairs investigation of Plaintiff ANDRADE for an incident that had occurred six months earlier. Based on information and belief, the investigation was initiated in retaliation for Plaintiff ANDRADE engaging in protected activities.
- 40. Ten days after his return to work (September 24, 2010), Defendant BALDIVIEZ initiated an Internal Affairs investigation of Plaintiff CRAIG for a minor incident that occurred on September 17, 2010. The incident was initiated by Defendant BAKER, and, based on information and belief it was initiated in retaliation for Plaintiff CRAIG's protected activities. Just one month earlier, Defendant BAKER made it clear to the City Council that he did not agree with the King CITY POA vote of no confidence.
- 41. The September 17, 2010 incident involved an allegation that Plaintiff CRAIG took too long (approx. 20 minutes) to transport a suspect to jail and return to King City. This incident was pursued by Defendant BAKER.
- 42. On or about September 27, 2010, Defendant BALDIVIEZ initiated another Internal Affairs investigation of Plaintiff CRAIG for another minor incident. The second incident occurred on September 25, 2010 and it involved an allegation that Plaintiff CRAIG used profanity with HUNTER. Specifically, when two police reports were returned to Plaintiff CRAIG by HUNTER to correct, Plaintiff CRAIG entered into HUNTER's office and said, "What the fuck is up with this shit?" HUNTER stated, "[e]xcuse me?" Plaintiff CRAIG quickly responded, "[m]aybe I should start over again." Hunter responded, "[t]hat would

- be a good idea." Plaintiff Craig then went on to explain why the reports should not have been sent back in a very respectful manner. CRAIG later apologized to HUNTER after he saw that his use of profanity offended him. The incident was initiated by Defendant HUNTER, and, based on information and belief, that it was initiated in retaliation for Plaintiff CRAIG's protected activities. Just one month earlier, Defendant HUNTER made it clear to the City Council that he did not agree with the King CITY POA vote of no confidence.
- 43. Based solely on the incidents above Defendant BALDIVIEZ ultimately ordered Plaintiff CRAIG to undergo an intrusive psychological examination. This referral was made, even though Claimant CRAIG's annual evaluation (completed September 19, 2010) was positive and devoid of any concern that CRAIG was unable to perform the duties of a police officer.
- 44. On September 25, 2010, with the assistance of Defendant HUNTER, Defendant BALDIVIEZ opened an internal affairs investigation on the King City Vice President, Plaintiff, AGUAYO. Defendant HUNTER went out of his way to make sure that the complaining party filed a complaint against AGUAYO, and he even personally delivered the complaint to the reporting party's home that was located approximately 50 miles away from the City of King and the King City Police Department's jurisdiction. This investigation was initiated just eleven days after BALDIVIEZ' returned to work.
- 45. Plaintiff AGUAYO was immediately placed on administrative leave and ordered not to enter any City property or to have any contact with any City employee, in any manner. The scope of this order violated the First Amendment, the Meyers Milias Brown Act, and Peace Officer's Procedural Bill of Rights. Public employees have the right to participate in union activities without interference by their employer. This order effectively prevented Plaintiff AGUAYO from any POA activities and from associating with all city employees.

- 46. On September 25, 2010, Defendant BALDIVIEZ issued a memo to all employees with the King City Police Department that Plaintiff AGUAYO was placed on administrative leave and ordered not to have any contact with any employee. If anyone had any contact with Plaintiff AGUAYO they were to notify Defendant BALDIVIEZ immediately. The scope of this order clearly violated the First Amendment, the Meyers Milias Brown Act, and Peace Officer's Procedural Bill of Rights. Public employees have the right to participate in union activities. This order effectively prevented all employees from having any sort of contact with Plaintiff AGUAYO.
- 47. In October 2010, Defendant BALDIVIEZ allegedly received a call from Leticia Diaz, a manager of STEWART dba Aaron's Sales and Lease, and she stated that Plaintiff AGUAYO was behind in his payments. This release of information violated the Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, Civil Code §1788 et. seq. and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1692.
- 48. One week later Defendant BALDIVIEZ allegedly contacted Diaz and discovered that Plaintiff ANDRADE came in and cosigned for the property on behalf of Plaintiff AGUAYO. Leticia Diaz subsequently released Plaintiff ANDRADE's private information, violating the Information Practices Act of 1977, Civil Code §§ 1798 et. seq.
- 49. On October 2010 Plaintiff CRAIG drafted a memo to Captain Miller stating that it was a hostile work environment working under the supervision of BAKER and HUNTER, and he requested a transfer. Defendant BALDIVIEZ denied his request and he stated there was no ground for CRAIG's claim, but stated that the request would be considered during the next shift change in January 2011. In the proposed January 2011 schedule Defendant BALDIVIEZ moved Plaintiff CRAIG from BAKER's shift to HUNTER's shift.

- 50. On November 22, 2010, Plaintiff ANDRADE was notified of an internal affairs investigation that was based on the allegation that he violated the no contact order. Defendant BALDIVIEZ also initiated another internal affairs investigation of Plaintiff AGUAYO for violating his order not to have any contact with a City employee for any reason.
- 51. On December 7, 2010 Defendant BALDIVIEZ, without a reasonable basis and in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §21112), ordered Plaintiff CRAIG to undergo an intrusive fitness for duty examination. This order was based on the alleged misconduct that occurred September 17th and 25th.
- 52. Plaintiff CRAIG refused to consent to the release of protected medical and mental health records compiled by Defendant GLICK to Defendant BALDIVIEZ. Based on information and belief, this angered the Defendants and it provided an additional motive for retaliation.
- 53. On December 31, 2010, Plaintiff CRAIG was placed on administrative leave do to Dr. Glick's finding that Claimant Craig was allegedly not fit.
- 54. On January 3, 2011, Plaintiff CRAIG consented to the release of information by Dr. Glick only to the extent that she was already authorized to release by law [California Civil Code §56.10 (c)(8)]. Plaintiff CRAIG did not consent to the release of detailed privileged psychological information. Despite the restricted scope of consent, Dr. Glick, unlawfully released confidential information in her report dated January 19, 2011. This blatant disregard of Claimant CRAIG's right to privacy and right to limit the scope of protected private information [see the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Civil Code §§56 et. seq.] demonstrated that Dr. Glick is not a neutral psychologist and is instead, performing retaliatory acts against Plaintiff CRAIG, on behalf of Defendant BALDIVIEZ, and as an agent of Defendant KING CITY.

- 55. On January 18, 2011, Defendant BALDIVIEZ notified Plaintiff ANDRADE that he was going to be suspended for two days for allegedly violating his no contact order.
- 56. On January 24, 2011, Defendant BALDIVIEZ opened yet another Internal Affairs investigation of Plaintiff AGUAYO.
- 57. On January 27, 2011, Defendant BALDIVIEZ opened yet another Internal Affairs investigation of Plaintiff ANDRADE.
- 58. On February 7, 2011, Defendant BALDIVIEZ terminated Plaintiff CRAIG based on the findings of Dr. Glick that Plaintiff CRAIG was not fit for duty.
- 59. Plaintiff CRAIG strongly disagreed with Dr. Glick's findings and, in fact, just days prior to the examination by Dr. Glick, he was examined by a qualified psychologist and was found to be fit.
- 60. Defendant BALDIVIEZ relied on a severely deficient report from Dr. Glick that failed to mention any functional limitations and/or reasonable accommodations.
- 61. Defendant BALDIVIEZ failed to consider the fact that Plaintiff CRAIG was found fit by a qualified psychologist who evaluated Plaintiff CRAIG just days before Dr. Glick. Defendant BALDIVIEZ declined to consider any accommodations. Defendant BALDIVIEZ relied on private information unlawfully release by Dr. Glick, in violation of state law.
- 62. Finally, Defendant BALDIVIEZ' hatred and ill will for Plaintiff CRAIG continued on after the improper discharge. Despite the fact that Defendant BALDIVIEZ stated in his Notice of Termination that the termination of Plaintiff CRAIG was not based on misconduct, Defendant BALDIVIEZ personally appeared before an Administrative Law Judge for the California Unemployment Appeals Board in a failed effort to prevent Plaintiff CRAIG from collecting unemployment benefits. Defendant BALDIVIEZ' appeared before Administrative

January 27, 2011.

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

65. In engaging in the aforementioned actions, Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO exercised their rights under state and federal law, including those to free speech, free association, the right to seek redress through petition, the right to engage in political activities and to report wrongdoing, corruption and other important information. Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO also exercised their rights under POBOR, MMBA, ADA, as well as their rights to privacy and confidentiality [See the Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt

Collections Practices Act, Civil Code §1788 et. seq; and the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1692; the Information Practices Act of 1977, Civil
Code §§ 1798 et. seq; and the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Civil
Code §§56 et. seq.] At all times, Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO
actions and conduct
were protected.

- 66. On February 25, 2011, Plaintiffs mailed a detailed Tort Claim to the King City Clerk in compliance with the Government Claims Act. Forty-five days has past and the City has not served Plaintiffs a rejection letter.
- 67. On March 8, 2011, Plaintiff CRAIG filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The EEOC mailed the Right to Sue Notice on March 10, 2011. This lawsuit was filed within the 90 day time period outlined in the Notice of Right to Sue letter.
- 68. On March 8, 2011, Plaintiff AGUAYO filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The EEOC mailed the Right to Sue Notice on March 18, 2011. This lawsuit was filed within the 90 day time period outlined in the Notice of Right to Sue letter.
- 69. On March 8, 2011, Plaintiff ANDRADE filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The EEOC mailed the Right to Sue Notice on March 10, 2011. This lawsuit was filed within the 90 day time period outlined in the Notice of Right to Sue letter.

V.

CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT ONE

42 U.S.C. 1983

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO against Defendants CITY OF KING CITY, BALDIVIEZ, POWERS, BAKER, HUNTER, and GLICK

- 70. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate each and every proceeding paragraph, as though set forth in full here.
- 71. Defendants CITY OF KING, BALDIVIEZ, POWERS, BAKER, and HUNTER retaliated against Plaintiff CRAIG by initiating bogus internal affair investigations in order to subject CRAIG to an adverse employment action. Defendants BAKER and HUNTER initiated the bogus internal affair investigations in order to set Plaintiff CRAIG up for and adverse employment action that would later be determined by Defendants BALDIVIEZ and POWERS.
- Based on information and belief Defendant BALDIVIEZ 72. communicated his hatred for CRAIG to Defendant GLICK in order to convey his preference that she ultimately find CRAIG unfit for duty. Defendant GLICK conducted a sham mental examination; her final report is severely deficient and it does not support her findings. Furthermore, despite having full knowledge that Plaintiff CRAIG did not consent to the release of private information, Defendant GLICK included the information in the report in order to ensure that Plaintiff CRAIG would be subjected to termination by Defendant BALDIVIEZ and POWERS. As a direct result of the Plaintiff CRAIG exercising his constitutional rights to free speech and participating in labor, organizational, social and political activities as a member and President of the Police Officers' Association, Defendants CITY OF KING, BALDIVIEZ, POWERS, BAKER, HUNTER, and GLICK took the aforementioned adverse actions against him. Plaintiff CRAIG also opposed a practice prohibited by the ADA. Absent said protected speech, Plaintiff CRAIG would not have suffered adverse employment actions, and would not have been injured.

1	73. Defendants CITY OF KING, BALDIVIEZ, POWERS, and HUNTER
2	retaliated against Plaintiff AGUAYO by initiating bogus internal affair
3	investigations in order to subject AGUAYO to an adverse employment
4	action, specifically termination. As a direct result of the Plaintiff AGUAYO
5	exercising his constitutional rights to free speech and participating in labor,
6	organizational, social and political activities as a member and Vice President
7	of the Police Officers' Association, Defendants CITY OF KING, BALDIVIEZ,
8	POWERS, and HUNTER, took the aforementioned adverse actions against him.
9	Plaintiff AGUAYO also opposed a practice prohibited by the ADA. Absent said
10	protected speech, Plaintiff AGUAYO would not have suffered adverse
11	employment actions, and would not have been injured. Plaintiff AGUAYO was
12	ordered not to enter any City property or to have any contact with any City
13	employee, in any manner. The scope of this order violated the First Amendment.
14	Public employees have the right to participate in union activities without
15	interference by their employer. This order effectively prevented Plaintiff
16	AGUAYO from any POA activities and from associating with all city employees.
17	74. Defendants CITY OF KING, BALDIVIEZ, POWERS, and BAKER,
18	retaliated against Plaintiff ANDRADE by initiating bogus internal affair
19	investigations in order to subject ANDRADE to adverse employment actions,
20	specifically three different suspensions. As a direct result of the Plaintiff
21	ANDRADE exercising his constitutional rights to free speech and participating in
22	labor, organizational, social and political activities as a member and Treasurer of
23	the Police Officers' Association, Defendants CITY OF KING, BALDIVIEZ,
24	POWERS, and BAKER, took the aforementioned adverse actions against him.
25	Plaintiff ANDRADE also opposed a practice prohibited by the ADA. Absent said
26	protected speech, Plaintiff ANDRADE would not have suffered adverse
27	employment actions, and would not have been injured.

- 75. The various acts of intimidation, reprisal, retaliation, suppression and/or restraint exercised by Defendants CITY OF KING, BALDIVIEZ, POWERS, BAKER, HUNTER, and GLICK against Plaintiffs have created a chilling effect on their legitimate political, social and organizational speech by creating fear, hesitation, hostility and other destructive responses.
- 76. In doing the things alleged herein, Defendants CITY OF KING, BALDIVIEZ, POWERS, BAKER, HUNTER, and GLICK, and each of them, violated the rights of Plaintiffs under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to free expression, association and assembly. Specifically, Defendants CITY OF KING, BALDIVIEZ, POWERS, BAKER, HUNTER, and GLICK have taken the aforementioned action against Plaintiffs in direct retaliation for, and in response to the various protected activities of Plaintiffs.
- As a direct and proximate result of the misconduct and unlawful actions of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiffs sustained severe and serious injury to their person, all to Plaintiffs damage in a sum to be shown according to proof. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered and continues to suffer substantial losses in income, earnings, and benefits and has been damaged in their capacity to earn their salary, and have lost, and will continue to lose, employment benefits. Plaintiffs have also suffered pain and suffering, mental anguish, and emotional distress.
- 78. Based upon information and belief, the acts and omissions of Defendants CITY OF KING, BALDIVIEZ, POWERS, BAKER, HUNTER, and GLICK, and each of them, were done by Defendants under color of state law and as final policy making authorities to which Defendant CITY OF KING CITY delegated its governing powers in the subject matter areas in which these policies were promulgated or decisions taken or customs and practices followed. The acts and omissions described above were taken by the City's official policy makers as

79. It was or should have been plainly obvious to any reasonable policy making official of City that the acts and omissions of Defendants BALDIVIEZ, POWERS, BAKER, HUNTER, and GLICK as alleged herein, taking singly or in conjunction, directly violated and continued to violate Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional and statutory rights. In doing the things alleged herein, Defendants BALDIVIEZ, POWERS, BAKER, HUNTER, and GLICK acted with malicious intent to violate Plaintiffs rights, or at least in conscious, reckless, and callous disregard of Plaintiffs rights and to the injurious consequences likely to result from a violation of said rights. General and special damages are sought according to proof. Punitive damages are sought against the individual defendants, according to proof.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

80. Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law to prevent future violations of their civil rights, and therefore seek extraordinary relief in the form of permanent injunctions, as hereafter described. Damages alone are inadequate and injunctive relief is sought to command Defendants to reinstate Plaintiff CRAIG's and AGUAYO's employment with the City, in order to place

1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

26

27

28

them in a position they would have been in, absent the unlawful conduct by Defendants.

COUNT TWO

Discrimination based on 'regarded as' disability - severe obesity [42 U.S.C. §12102(3); 42 U.S.C. §12112(a)]

Plaintiffs CRAIG and ANDRADE against Defendant CITY OF KING CITY.

- 81. Plaintiffs CRAIG and ANDRADE hereby incorporates each and every preceding paragraph as though set forth in full here.
- 82. Plaintiffs CRAIG and ANDRADE are employees of Defendant CITY OF KING CITY, as defined in 42 U.S.C. §12111(4).
- Plaintiffs CRAIG and ANDRADE are "qualified individuals" and the Defendant CITY OF KING CITY regarded CRAIG and ANDRADE as being disabled due to perceived severe obesity. See 42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(C); 42 U.S.C. §12111(8); U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Resources for Human Development, Inc., E.D. La., No. 2:10-cv-03322 (filed Sept. 30, 2010).
- 84. According to 42 U.S.C. §12112(a), "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedure, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."
- 85. Plaintiffs CRAIG and ANDRADE were discriminated against based on this perception because they required to participate in a weight loss program under threat of termination by Defendant BALDIVIEZ. They were forced to participate in the program despite the fact that a medical doctor reported to Defendant BALDIVIEZ that CRAIG and ANDRADE were fit for duty. When CRAIG later spoke with Defendant BALDIVIEZ, Defendant BALDIVIEZ responded, "You are fit to exercise." Based on information and belief, private information about CRAIG and ANDRADE was released

- 86. Plaintiff CRAIG was placed on a weight loss program and ordered to lose at least eight pounds a month. One month CRAIG did not make the weight loss as dictated by Defendant BALDIVIEZ and he was given a letter of discussion.
- 87. Despite the Defendants perception that CRAIG was overweight, he demonstrated that he was fit to work as a police officer. On one occasion, CRAIG successfully jumped approximately ten six foot fences with his patrol rifle to clear residential back yards for a shooting suspect. Nevertheless, he was still kept on the weight loss program. Capt. Bruce Miller asked the City Manager, Defendant POWERS, if CRAIG was going to be kept on the weight loss program even though he had performed his duties by jumping so many fences and Defendant POWERS responded that CRAIG was going to stay on the weight loss program because public perception was that CRAIG was overweight. A couple of months later, when a "fit" officer went out on medical for a month for a heart condition, CRAIG informed Chief Baldiviez he was seeking legal counsel regarding the weight loss program.
- 88. Plaintiff CRAIG told Defendant BALDIVIEZ that the mandated weight loss program violated state and federal laws. After Plaintiff CRAIG reported the law violations to Defendant BALDIVIEZ and indicated that the officers in the weight loss program, including Plaintiff ANDRADE, were going to seek legal counsel, the mandated weight loss program quickly ceased.
- 89. In March of 2011, Plaintiff's CRAIG and ANDRADE requested received copies of their personnel files and all the documents referencing the weight loss program were removed. Based on information and belief, Defendants POWERS and BALDIVIEZ destroyed the records related to the weight loss program in order to hide their illegal acts.
- 90. Defendant CITY of KING CITY subjected Plaintiff's CRAIG and ANDRADE to bogus internal affair investigations in order to subject them to

subsequent adverse employment actions. Defendants BAKER and HUNTER initiated the bogus internal affair investigations in order to set Plaintiffs CRAIG and ANDRADE up for an adverse employment action that would later be determined by Defendants BALDIVIEZ and POWERS. Plaintiff CRAIG was ultimately terminated and ANDRADE was suspended on three separate occasions.

- 91. As a direct and proximate result of the misconduct and unlawful actions of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiffs CRAIG and ANDRADE sustained severe and serious injury to their person, all to Plaintiffs damage in a sum to be shown according to proof. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered and continues to suffer substantial losses in income, earnings, and benefits and has been damaged in their capacity to earn their salary, and have lost, and will continue to lose, employment benefits. Plaintiffs have also suffered pain and suffering, mental anguish, and emotional distress.
- 92. In doing the things alleged herein, Defendant CITY OF KING CITY violated the rights of Plaintiffs CRAIG and ANDRADE protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act.

COUNT THREE

Retaliation for reporting/opposing a violation of the ADA [42 U.S.C. §12203]

Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO against Defendant CITY OF KING CITY.

- 93. Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE and AGUAYO hereby corporate each and every preceding paragraph as though set forth in full here.
- 94. According to 42 U.S.C. §12203(a), "[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter..."

- 95. Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE and AGUAYO opposed the unlawful weight loss program implemented by Defendant BALDIVIEZ under threat of termination and they were subjected to adverse employment actions as a result.
- 96. Defendant CITY OF KING CITY retaliated against Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO by initiating bogus internal affair investigations in order to subject them to subsequent adverse employment actions. Defendants BAKER and HUNTER initiated the bogus internal affair investigations in order to set Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO up for an adverse employment actions that would later be determined by Defendants BALDIVIEZ and POWERS. Plaintiffs CRAIG and AGUAYO were ultimately terminated and ANDRADE was suspended on three separate occasions.
- 97. As a direct result of the Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO exercising their right to oppose discriminatory practices, Defendant CITY OF KING CITY took the aforementioned adverse actions against them. Absent said protected activity, Plaintiff CRAIG would not have suffered adverse employment actions, and would not have been injured.
- 98. As a direct and proximate result of the misconduct and unlawful actions of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiffs sustained severe and serious injury to their person, all to Plaintiffs damage in a sum to be shown according to proof. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered and continues to suffer substantial losses in income, earnings, and benefits and has been damaged in their capacity to earn their salary, and have lost, and will continue to lose, employment benefits. Plaintiffs have also suffered pain and suffering, mental anguish, and emotional distress.
 - 99. General and special damages are sought according to proof.
- 100. Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law to prevent future violations of their rights under the ADA, and therefore seek extraordinary relief in the form of permanent injunctions, as hereafter described. Damages alone

are inadequate and injunctive relief is sought to command Defendants to reinstate Plaintiff CRAIG's and AGUAYO's employment with the City, in order to place them in a position they would have been in, absent the unlawful conduct by Defendants.

COUNT FOUR

Unlawful Order for Fitness for Duty Evaluation [42 U.S.C. §12112(d)(4)(A)]

Plaintiff CRAIG against Defendant CITY OF KING CITY.

- 101. Plaintiff CRAIG hereby incorporates each and every preceding paragraph as though set forth in full here.
- 102. According to 42 U.S.C. §21112(d)(4)(A), "[a] covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be jobrelated and consistent with business necessity."
- 103. On September 14, 2010, Defendant BALDIVIEZ returned to work following the internal investigation and administrative leave.
- 104. Ten days after his return to work (September 24, 2010), Defendant BALDIVIEZ initiated an Internal Affairs investigation of Plaintiff CRAIG for a minor incident that occurred on September 17, 2010. The incident was initiated by Defendant BAKER, and, based on information and belief it was initiated in retaliation for Plaintiff CRAIG's protected activities. Just one month earlier, Defendant BAKER made it clear to the City Council that he did not agree with the King CITY POA vote of no confidence.
- 105. The September 17, 2010 incident involved an allegation that Plaintiff CRAIG took too long (20 minutes) to transport a suspect to jail. This incident was pursued by Defendant BAKER.

24

25

26

27

- 106. On or about September 27, 2010, Defendant BALDIVIEZ initiated another Internal Affairs investigation of Plaintiff CRAIG for another minor incident. The second incident occurred on September 25, 2010 and it involved an allegation that Plaintiff CRAIG used profanity with HUNTER. Specifically, when two police reports were returned to Plaintiff CRAIG by HUNTER to correct, Plaintiff CRAIG entered into HUNTER's office and said, "What the fuck is up with this shit?" HUNTER stated, "[e]xcuse me?" Plaintiff CRAIG quickly responded, "[m]aybe I should start over again." Hunter responded, "[t]hat would be a good idea." Plaintiff Craig then went on to explain why the reports should not have been sent back in a very respectful manner. CRAIG later apologized to HUNTER after he saw that his use of profanity offended him. The incident was initiated by Defendant HUNTER, and, based on information and belief, it was initiated in retaliation for Plaintiff CRAIG's protected activities. Just one month earlier, Defendant HUNTER made it clear to the City Council that he did not agree with the King CITY POA vote of no confidence.
- 107. Based solely on the incidents above Defendant BALDIVIEZ ultimately ordered Plaintiff CRAIG to undergo an intrusive psychological examination. This referral was made, even though Plaintiff CRAIG's annual evaluation (completed September 19, 2010) was positive and void of any concern that CRAIG was unable to perform the duties of a police officer.
- 108. On December 7, 2010, Defendant BALDIVIEZ, without a reasonable basis and in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, ordered Plaintiff CRAIG to undergo an intrusive fitness for duty examination for his conduct related to the two incidents above. Taking too long (20 minutes) to book a suspect on one occasion and using profanity in one sentence with a supervisor (and thereafter immediately apologizing) is insufficient facts to support a referral for an intrusive fitness for duty exam. It is objectively unreasonable.

6

9

13 14

15

12

16 17

18 19

20

22

23

21

24 25

26

28

- Plaintiff CRAIG refused to consent to the release of protected medical 109. and mental health records compiled by Defendant GLICK to Defendant BALDIVIEZ. Based on information and belief, this angered the Defendants and it provided an additional motive for retaliation.
- On December 31, 2010, Plaintiff CRAIG was placed on 110. administrative leave do to Dr. Glick's finding that Plaintiff Craig was allegedly not fit.
- 111. On January 3, 2011, Plaintiff CRAIG consented to the release of information by Dr. Glick only to the extent that she was already authorized to release by law [California Civil Code §56.10 (c)(8)]. Plaintiff CRAIG did not consent to the release of detailed privileged psychological information. Despite the restricted scope of consent, Dr. Glick, unlawfully released confidential information in her report dated January 19, 2011. This blatant disregard of Claimant CRAIG's right to privacy and right to limit the scope of protected private information [see the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Civil Code §§56 et. seq.] demonstrated that Dr. Glick is not a neutral psychologist and is instead, performing retaliatory acts against Plaintiff CRAIG, on behalf of Defendant BALDIVIEZ, and as an agent of Defendant CITY of KING CITY.
- 112. Defendant CITY OF KING CITY retaliated against Plaintiff CRAIG, by sending him for a mandatory Fitness for Duty Examination without an objective basis. Plaintiff CRAIG was ultimately terminated based on the findings of the Defendant GLICK. As a direct and proximate result of the misconduct and unlawful actions of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff sustained severe and serious injury to his person, all to Plaintiffs damage in a sum to be shown according to proof. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff CRAIG has suffered and continues to suffer substantial losses in income, earnings, and benefits and has been damaged in his capacity to earn his salary, and

4 5

6

7 8 9

10 11

13

14

12

15

16

17 18

19

21

22

20

23 24

25

26 27

28

has lost, and will continue to lose, employment benefits. Plaintiff has also suffered pain and suffering, mental anguish, and emotional distress.

- 113. General and special damages are sought according to proof.
- 114. Plaintiff CRAIG does not have a plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law to prevent future violations of their rights under the ADA, and therefore seeks extraordinary relief in the form of permanent injunctions, as hereafter described. Damages alone are inadequate and injunctive relief is sought to command Defendants to reinstate Plaintiff CRAIG's employment with the City, in order to place them in a position they would have been in, absent the unlawful conduct by Defendants.

COUNT FIVE

Violation of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act

[Gov't Code §§ 3502, 3506; California Code of Civil Procedure §1085] Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO against Defendant CITY of KING **CITY**

- 115. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate each and every preceding paragraph as though set forth in full here. Plaintiffs seek a Writ of Mandate ordering the CITY of KING CITY to comply with Government Code §3502 and §3506.
- 116. Government Code sections 3502 and 3506 prohibit public agencies from interfering with, or discriminating against, public employees because of their participation in the activities of employee organizations for the purpose of representation on all matters of employer-employee relations. Plaintiffs seek a Writ of Mandate ordering the CITY of KING CITY to comply with Government Code §3502 and §3506.
- Section 3502 states, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by the Legislature, public employees shall have the right to form, join, and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of

representation on all matters of employer-employee relations. Public employees also shall have the right to refuse to join or participate in the activities of employee organizations and shall have the right to represent themselves individually in their employment relations with the public agency."

- 118. Section 3506 states, "[p]ublic agencies and employee organizations shall not interfere with, intimidate, restrain, coerce or discriminate against public employees because of their exercise of their rights under Section 3502.
- 119. Writ of Mandate is required to gain compliance with the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. *Henneberque v. City of Culver* (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 250, 254 ["It has been held that a writ of mandate was proper to correct discrimination against employees who exercise their rights under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act."]
- 120. On September 25, 2010, Defendant BALDIVIEZ issued a memo to all employees with the King City Police Department that Plaintiff AGUAYO was placed on administrative leave and ordered not to have any contact with any employee. If anyone had any contact with Plaintiff
 AGUAYO they were to notify Defendant BALDIVIEZ immediately. The scope of this order clearly violated the Meyers Milias Brown Act. Public employees have

this order clearly violated the Meyers Milias Brown Act. Public employees have the right to participate in union activities. This order effectively prevented all employees from having any sort of contact with Plaintiff AGUAYO.

of no confidence in the Chief July 30, 2010, the Defendant CITY of KING CITY, retaliated against Plaintiffs by issuing a blanket no contact order between Plaintiff AGUAYO and Plaintiff's ANDRADE and CRAIG. All three Plaintiffs were board members of the King City Police Officers Association, and the blanket no contact order was implemented in order to interfere with their union activities. Defendant BALDIVIEZ subjected AGUAYO and ANDRADE to adverse employment actions for allegedly violating this unlawful order. Plaintiff AGUAYO was

ultimately terminated and ANDRADE was suspended. Plaintiff CRAIG was also terminated for engaging in protected activities.

- 122. Plaintiffs engaged in activities protected by the Meyers Milias Brown Act. As a direct result of this participation, including the vote of no confidence on July 30, 2010, Defendant CITY of KING CITY took the aforementioned adverse actions against Plaintiffs. Absent said speech activities, the Defendant would not have taken said actions. In doing the things alleged herein, Defendant CITY of KING CITY violated the rights of Plaintiffs as set forth herein.
- 123. As a direct and proximate result of the misconduct and unlawful actions of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiffs sustained severe and serious injury to their person, all to Plaintiffs damage in a sum to be shown according to proof. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered and continues to suffer substantial losses in income, earnings, and benefits and has been damaged in their capacity to earn their salary, and have lost, and will continue to lose, employment benefits. Plaintiffs have also suffered pain and suffering, mental anguish, and emotional distress.
 - 124. General and special damages are sought according to proof.
- 125. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies to compel the relief sought herein, including the filing of a Claim for Damages which has been rejected by operation of law.

COUNT SIX

Violations of Peace Officer Bill of Rights

[California Government Code §§ 3302(a), 3309.5]

Plaintiffs CRAIG, ANDRADE, and AGUAYO against Defendant CITY of KING

- Plaintiffs hereby incorporate each and every preceding paragraph as though set forth in full here.
- 128. California Government Code section 3302(a) states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, or whenever on duty or in uniform, no public safety officer shall be prohibited from engaging, or be coerced or required to engage, in political activity."
- memo to all employees with the King City Police Department that Plaintiff AGUAYO was placed on administrative leave and ordered not to have any contact with any employee. If anyone had any contact with Plaintiff AGUAYO they were to notify Defendant BALDIVIEZ immediately. The scope of this order clearly violated the Peace Officer Bill of Rights Act. Police officers have the right to participate in union activities. This order effectively prevented all employees from having any sort of contact with Plaintiff AGUAYO.
- 130. After Plaintiffs engaged in protected activities, including the vote of no confidence in the Chief July 30, 2010, the Defendant CITY of KING CITY, retaliated against Plaintiffs by issuing a blanket no contact order between Plaintiff AGUAYO and Plaintiff's ANDRADE and CRAIG. All three Plaintiffs were board members of the King City Police Officers Association, and the blanket no contact order was implemented in order to interfere with their union activities. Defendant BALDIVIEZ subjected AGUAYO and ANDRADE to adverse employment actions for allegedly violating this unlawful order. Plaintiff AGUAYO was ultimately terminated and ANDRADE was suspended. Plaintiff CRAIG was also terminated for engaging in protected activities.
- 131. Plaintiffs engaged in activities protected by this statute. As a direct result of this participation, including the vote of no confidence on July 30, 2010, Defendant CITY of KING CITY took the aforementioned adverse actions

against Plaintiffs. Absent said speech activities, the Defendant would not have taken said actions. In doing the things alleged herein, Defendant CITY of KING CITY violated the rights of Plaintiff as set forth herein.

- unlawful actions of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiffs sustained severe and serious injury to their person, all to Plaintiffs damage in a sum to be shown according to proof. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered and continues to suffer substantial losses in income, earnings, and benefits and has been damaged in their capacity to earn their salary, and have lost, and will continue to lose, employment benefits. Plaintiffs have also suffered pain and suffering, mental anguish, and emotional distress.
 - 133. General and special damages are sought according to proof.
- 134. Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies to compel the relief sought herein, including the filing of a Claim for Damages which has been rejected by operation of law.
- 135. Government Code Section 3309.5 provides that where it finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov't Code sections 3300 et seq.), to render appropriate injunctive or other extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature including, but not limited to the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer.
- 136. Defendant CITY of KING CITY employs law enforcement personnel, including Plaintiffs, and is charged with the duty of acting in accordance with the requirements of state law, including Government Code section 3300 et seq.

- 137. Defendants maliciously violated Government Code sections 3300 et seq. with the intent to injure Plaintiff in retaliation for the lawful exercise of his statutory and constitutional rights. Defendants are therefore liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars (\$25,000) for each violation, for reasonable attorney's fees as may be determined by the court, as well as Plaintiff's actual damages, as provided in Government Code Section 3309.5. In engaging in the aforementioned activities, Plaintiff's engaged in activities protected by these statutes. As a direct result of the Plaintiff's protected speech, activities, and disclosures, the Defendants took the aforementioned adverse actions against them. Absent said speech, Defendants would not have taken said actions. In doing the things alleged herein, Defendants, and each of them, violated the rights of Plaintiffs as set forth herein.
- 138. In doing the things alleged herein, Defendants acted with malicious intent to violate Plaintiffs rights, or at least in conscious, reckless, and callous disregard of Plaintiffs rights and to the injurious consequences likely to result from a violation of said rights.
- 139. General damages, special damages, and civil penalties are sought according to proof.

COUNT SEVEN

Violation of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act ("CMIA") [Civil Code §§56.35; 56.36(b)]

Plaintiff CRAIG against Defendant CITY of KING CITY and GLICK

- 140. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each and every preceding paragraph as though set forth in full here.
- 141. Civil Code §56.10(a) states, "[n]o provider of health care, health care service plan, or contractor shall disclose medical information regarding a patient of the provider of health care or an enrollee or subscriber of a health care service plan without first obtaining an authorization, except as provided in

subdivision (b) or (c)."

- 142. Civil Code §56.10(c)(8) states, "[a] provider of health care or health care service plan that has created medical information as a result of employment-related health care services to an employee conducted at the specific prior written request and expense of the employer may disclose to the employee's employer that part of the information that:
 - (A) Is relevant in a lawsuit, arbitration, grievance, or other claim or challenge to which the employer and the employee are parties and in which the patient has placed in issue his or her medical history, mental or physical condition, or treatment, provided that information may only be used or disclosed in connection with that proceeding.
 - (B) Describes functional limitations of the patient that may entitle the patient to leave from work for medical reasons or limit the patient's fitness to perform his or her present employment, provided that no statement of medical cause is included in the information disclosed."
- 143. As such, absent consent from the employee, an employer has restricted access to the employee's medical records. Civil Code §56.35 states, "[i]n addition to any other remedies available at law, a patient whose medical information has been used or disclosed in violation of Section 56.10 or 56.104 or 56.20 or subdivision (a) of Section 56.26 and who has sustained economic loss or personal injury there from may recover compensatory damages, punitive damages not to exceed three thousand dollars (\$3,000), attorneys' fees not to exceed one thousand dollars (\$1,000), and the costs of litigation."

- On January 3, 2011, Plaintiff CRAIG consented to the release of information by Dr. Glick only to the extent that she was already authorized to release by law [California Civil Code §56.10 (c)(8)].
- psychological information. Despite the restricted scope of consent, Defendant GLICK unlawfully released confidential information in her report dated January 19, 2011. This blatant disregard of Plaintiff CRAIG's right to privacy and right to limit the scope of protected private information demonstrated that Dr. Glick is not a neutral psychologist and is instead, performing retaliatory acts against Plaintiff CRAIG, on behalf of Defendant BALDIVIEZ, and as an agent of Defendant CITY of KING CITY.
- 147. Plaintiff CRAIG was ultimately terminated based on the findings of the Defendant GLICK. As a direct and proximate result of the misconduct and unlawful actions of the Defendants CITY of KING CITY and GLICK, and each of them, Plaintiff sustained severe and serious injury to his person, all to Plaintiff's damage in a sum to be shown according to proof. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff CRAIG has suffered and continues to suffer substantial losses in income, earnings, and benefits and has been damaged in his capacity to earn his salary, and has lost, and will continue to lose, employment benefits. Plaintiff has also suffered pain and suffering, mental anguish, and emotional distress.

COUNT EIGHT

Violation of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act [Civil Code §56.20]

Plaintiff CRAIG against CITY of KING CITY

148. Plaintiff CRAIG repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth above, and incorporates same by reference as though set forth fully herein.

- disclose, or knowingly permit its employees or agents to use or disclose medical information which the employer possesses pertaining to its employees without the patient having first signed an authorization" Plaintiff CRAIG was eventually fired based upon the unlawful disclosure of medical information by Defendant GLICK. As a result, Defendant, City of KING CITY violated Section 56.20(c) of the CMIA. In addition, subsection (b) provides that "no employee shall be discriminated against in terms or conditions of employment due to that employee's refusal to sign an authorization." "An employer 'discriminates' against an employee in violation of [California Civil Code] section 56.20, subdivision (b), if it improperly retaliates against or penalizes an employee for refusing to authorize the employee's healthcare provider to disclose confidential medical information to the employers or others..." Plaintiff CRAIG was fired for refusing to allow the unlawful disclosure of his medical information.
- unlawfulness of Defendant, and the resulting termination of Plaintiff's employ, Plaintiff CRAIG has sustained severe and serious injury to his person, all to Plaintiff's damage in a sum to be shown according to proof. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer substantial losses in income, earnings, and benefits and has been damaged in his capacity to earn his salary, and has lost, and will continue to lose, employment benefits. Plaintiff has also suffered pain and suffering, and mental anguish and emotional distress.
- 151. The aforementioned acts directed towards Plaintiff CRAIG were carried out with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights and with the intent to vex, injure and annoy Plaintiff, such as to constitute oppression, fraud or malice.

1 **COUNT NINE** 2 Violation of the Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act 3 [Civil Code §1788 et. seq] 4 Plaintiffs AGUAYO against Defendant CITY of KING CITY and STEWART dba 5 Aaron's Sales and Lease 6 152. Plaintiff AGUAYO hereby incorporates each and every preceding 7 paragraph as though set forth in full here. 8 According to Civil Code §1788.12(a), no debt collector shall 153. 9 collect or attempt to collect a debt by communicating with the debtor's employer 10 unless the communication is necessary to the collection of the debt. If the 11 communication is necessary to the collection of a debt, it must first be in writing. 12 154. In October 2010, Defendant BALDIVIEZ allegedly received a call 13 from Leticia Diaz, a manager of Defendant STEWART dba Aaron's Sales and 14 Lease, and she stated that Plaintiff AGUAYO was behind in his payments. This 15 communication was not a written communication as required by Civil Code 16 §1788.12(a). 17 18 155. Defendants BALDIVIEZ and CITY of KING CITY used 19 information improperly disclosed by Defendant STEWART dba Aaron's Sales and 20 Lease in order to subject AGUAYO to termination. 21 156. Civil Code §1788.30 allows for Plaintiff AGUAYO to institute a 22 civil suit for damages for a violation of this statute 23 157. Plaintiff AGUAYO did not consent to the communication by 24 Defendant STEWART dba Aaron's Sales and Lease to his employer Defendant 25 BALDIVIEZ and CITY of KING CITY. 26 27 28

COUNT TEN

Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act [15 U.S.C.A. §1692]

Plaintiff AGUAYO against Defendant CITY of KING CITY and STEWART dba Aaron's Sales and Lease

- Plaintiff AGUAYO hereby incorporates each and every preceding paragraph as though set forth in full here.
- 159. According to 15 U.S.C.A §1692c(b), "[e]xcept as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a post judgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector."
- 160. U.S.C.A §1692b(2) states that the debt collector cannot disclose to a third party that the consumer owes a debt.
- 161. In October 2010, Defendant BALDIVIEZ allegedly received a call from Leticia Diaz, a manager of Defendant STEWART dba Aaron's Sales and Lease, and she stated that Plaintiff AGUAYO was behind in his payments. This release of information to Defendant BALDIVIEZ violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
- 161. Plaintiff AGUAYO did not consent to the communication by Defendant STEWART dba Aaron's Sales and Lease to his employer Defendant BALDIVIEZ and CITY of KING CITY.

	I
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	The same of the sa
9	
10	-
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	

27

28

162. Defendants BALDIVIEZ and CITY of KING CITY used information improperly disclosed by Defendant STEWART dba Aaron's Sales and Lease in order to subject AGUAYO to termination.

COUNT ELEVEN

Violation of the Information Practices Act of 1977 [Civil Code §§ 1798 et. seq.]

Plaintiff ANDRADE against Defendant CITY of KING CITY and STEWART dba Aaron's Sales and Lease

- 163. Plaintiff ANDRADE hereby incorporates each and every preceding paragraph as though set forth in full here.
- 164. Civil Code §1798.81.5 (a) states, "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that personal information about California residents is protected. To that end, the purpose of this section is to encourage businesses that own or license personal information about Californians to provide reasonable security for that information…"
- 165. According to Civil Code §1798.81.5 (d), driver's license numbers and Social Security numbers are considered "personal information."
- 166. In October 2010, Defendant BALDIVIEZ allegedly received a call from Leticia Diaz, a manager of Defendant STEWART dba Aaron's Sales and Lease, and she stated that Plaintiff AGUAYO was behind in his payments.
- 167. One week later Defendant BALDIVIEZ allegedly contacted Diaz and discovered that Plaintiff ANDRADE came in and cosigned for the property on behalf of Plaintiff AGUAYO. Leticia Diaz subsequently released Plaintiff ANDRADE's private information (Social Security number and driver's license number) to an unauthorized individual, Defendant BALDIVIEZ, thereby violating the Information Practices Act of 1977.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiffs CRAIG, AGUAYO, and ANDRADE hereby demand a jury trial under F.R. Civ. P., Rule 38 and C.D. Local Rule 38-1. Dated: May 20, 2011 LACKIE DAMMEIER & MCGILL, APC Russell M. Perry, Attorney for Plaintiffs CRAIG, AGUAYO and ANDRADE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR DISCOVERY

This case has been assigned to District Judge George King and the assigned discovery Magistrate Judge is Alicia G. Rosenberg.

The case number on all documents filed with the Court should read as follows:

CV11- 4399 GHK (AGRx)

Pursuant to General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the Magistrate Judge has been designated to hear discovery related motions.

A	all discovery related motions	shou	ald be noticed on the calendar	of th	e Magistrate Judge
-	======:		==========		
			NOTICE TO COUNSEL		
A co filed,	py of this notice must be served v a copy of this notice must be ser	vith the ved or	e summons and complaint on all del n all plaintiffs).	endar	nts (if a removal action is
Subs	sequent documents must be filed	at the	following location:		
[X]	Western Division 312 N. Spring St., Rm. G-8 Los Angeles, CA 90012		Southern Division 411 West Fourth St., Rm. 1-053 Santa Ana, CA 92701-4516		Eastern Division 3470 Twelfth St., Rm. 134 Riverside, CA 92501

Failure to file at the proper location will result in your documents being returned to you.

Case 2:11-cv-04399-GHK-AGR Document 1	Filed 05/23/11 Page 44 of 48 Page ID #:45 ORIGINA
Name & Address: Russell M. Perry, (SBN 246252)	3411011147
russell@policeattorney.com	
LACKIE, DAMMEIER & MCGILL, APC	
367 North Second Avenue Upland, CA 91786	
UNITED STATES I CENTRAL DISTRIC	
CHRISTOPHER CRAIG, ABRAHAM AGUAYO, and JAIME ANDRADE,	CASE NUMBER
PLAINTIFF(S) V.	CV11-04399GAK(AGR
CITY OF KING CITY a municipal corporation; NICK	
BALDIVIEZ, individually and as Chief of Police for	
the King City Police Department; (See Attachment)	SUMMONS
DEFENDANT(S).	
must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached ☑ c □ counterclaim □ cross-claim or a motion under Rule 1: or motion must be served on the plaintiff's attorney. Ru	2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer ssell M .Perry, whose address is e, Upland, CA 91786 If you fail to do so,
0.0.2011	Clerk, U.S. District Court
MAY 2 3 2011 Dated:	By:
	(Seal of the Court)
[Use 60 days if the defendant is the United States or a United States 60 days by Rule 12(a)(3)].	s agency, or is an officer or employee of the United States. Allowed
CV-01A (12/07) SUMN	IONS

	ORT TITLE: Craig, et al v. City of King City, et al							
1	Attachment to SUMMONS: Additional Defendants							
2								
3	MICHAEL POWERS, individually and as City Manager for the King City; MARK BAKER,							
4	individually and as Sergeant for the King City Police Department; JERRY HUNTER, individually and as "acting" Sergeant for the King City Police Department; MYRNA GLICK, individually, and as an agent for							
5	King City; THE STEWART, LLC, dba Aaron's Sales and Lease; and DOES 1 THROUGH 10							
6	INCLUSIVE							
7								
8								
9								
10								
11								
12								
13								
14								
15								
16								
17								
18								
19								
20								
21								
22								
23								
24								
25								
26	(Required for verified pleading) The items on this page stated on information and belief are (specify item numbers, not line numbers):							
27	This page may be used with any Judicial Council form or any other paper filed with the court.							

Case 2:11-cv-04399 GHKAAGADIS PROLIMENTAL, Filedros/23/1410 Page: 4610 54811 Page ID #:47 CIVIL COVER SHEET

I (a) PLAINTIFFS (Check box Christopher Craig, Abra	if you are representing yourself []) aham Aguayo, and Jaime Andra) ide,	DEFENDANTS City of King City, a muindividually and as Chie Michael Powers, individ	f of Police for King City	Police Department;	
(b) County of Residence of Firs Monterey County	t Listed Plaintiff (Except in U.S. Pl	aintiff Cases):	County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (In U.S. Plaintiff Cases Only): Monterey County			
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Ad yourself, provide same.) Russell M. Perry, Esq. Lackie Dammeier McG 367 N. Second Avenue Upland, CA 91786		u are representing	Attorneys (If Known)			
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION	N (Place an X in one box only.)		NSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PART X in one box for plaintiff and o		s Only	
☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff	▼ 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)	Citizen of Thi		DEF ☐ 1 Incorporated or F of Business in th		
☐ 2 U.S. Government Defendan	t		other State 2 Direct of a Foreign Country 3	of Business in A		
IV. ORIGIN (Place an X in on	- 1	Citizen of 3dd	get of a Poleign Country 13	☐ 3 Foreign Nation	□6 □6	
Proceeding State Co	AINT: JURY DEMAND: 4	Reopened es □ No (Check 'Y	5 Transferred from another dis 7es' only if demanded in compla 3 MONEY DEMANDED IN C	Distr Litig int.)		
42 U.S.C. VII. NATURE OF SUIT (Place)	e the U.S. Civil Statute under which te an X in one box only.)					
OTHER STATUTES 400 State Reapportionment	CONTRACT ☐ 110 Insurance	TORTS PERSONAL INJU	TORTS RY PERSONAL	PRISONER PETITIONS	LABOR ☐ 710 Fair Labor Standards	
□ 410 Antitrust □ 430 Banks and Banking □ 450 Commerce/ICC Rates/etc. □ 460 Deportation □ 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations □ 480 Consumer Credit □ 490 Cable/Sat TV □ 810 Selective Service □ 850 Securities/Commodities /Exchange □ 875 Customer Challenge 12 USC 3410 □ 890 Other Statutory Actions □ 891 Agricultural Act □ 892 Economic Stabilization Act □ 893 Environmental Matters □ 894 Energy Allocation Act □ 895 Freedom of Info. Act □ 990 Appeal of Fee Determination Under Equal Access to Justice □ 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes	□ 120 Marine □ 130 Miller Act □ 140 Negotiable Instrument □ 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment □ 151 Medicare Act □ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loan (Excl. Veterans) □ 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits □ 160 Stockholders' Suits □ 190 Other Contract □ 195 Contract Product Liability □ 196 Franchise	□ 310 Airplane □ 315 Airplane Product Liability □ 320 Assault, Libe Slander □ 330 Fed. Employe Liability □ 340 Marine □ 345 Marine Product Liability □ 350 Motor Vehic Product Liab □ 360 Other Person Injury □ 362 Personal Injury □ 363 Personal Injury Product Liab □ 364 Asbestos Per Injury Product Liability	□ 371 Truth in Lending □ 380 Other Personal Property Damage Product Liability BANKRUPTCY □ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 le □ 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 CIVIL RIGHTS □ 441 Voting □ 442 Employment □ 443 Housing/Acco- mmodations □ 444 Welfare □ 445 American with Disabilities -	☐ 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence Habeas Corpus ☐ 530 General ☐ 535 Death Penalty	Act 720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations 730 Labor/Mgmt. Reporting & Disclosure Act 740 Railway Labor Act 790 Other Labor Litigation 791 Empl. Ret. Inc. Security Act PROPERTY RIGHTS 820 Copyrights 830 Patent 840 Trademark SOCIAL SECURITY	
	: Has this action been previously fi	led and dismissed, re	emanded or closed W No	Yes		
If yes, list case number(s):	: V	77.	142"			
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY:	Case Number:	A 44		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		

SHORT TITLE: - Craig, et al v. City of King City, et al	CASE NUMBER:
1 Attachment to CIVIL COVER SHEET : Additional Defendants	
2	
City Manager for the King City; MARK BAKER, individually and a	
Department; JERRY HUNTER, individually and as "acting" Sergeant Department; MYRNA GLICK, individually, and as an agent for King	
Aaron's Sales and Lease; and DOES 1 THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE	eny, mie sie winn, ees, dou
3	
7	
8	
9	
0	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
21	
23	
24	
25	
(Required for verified pleading) The items on this page stated on information and bel numbers):	lief are (specify item numbers, not line
This page may be used with any Judicial Council form or any other paper filed with	the court. Page 2

Case 2:11-cv-04399-GHK-AGR Document 1 Filed 05/23/11 Page 48 of 48 Page ID #:49 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL COVER SHEET

AFTER COMPLETING THE FRONT SIDE OF FORM CV-71, COMPLETE THE INFORMATION REQUESTED BELOW.

VIII(b). RELATED CASES:	Have any cases been pre	eviously filed that are related to the present car	ise? ♥No □ Yes	
If yes, list case number(s):				
	A. Arise from the sam B. Call for determinat C. For other reasons w	e or closely related transactions, happenings, of ion of the same or substantially related or similated entail substantial duplication of labor if	ilar questions of law and fact; or	
Check here if the U.S. govern	County, or State if othe ment, its agencies or em	r than California, in which EACH named pla uployees is a named plaintiff.	aintiff resides (Use an additional sheet if necessary)	
Monterey County				
List the California County, or Str Check here if the U.S. gover Monterey County	ate if other than Californ nment, its agencies or en	nia, in which EACH named defendant resides in a named defendant.	s. (Use an additional sheet if necessary).	
			•	
Note: In land condemnation case Monterey County	es, use the location of th	ornia, in which EACH claim arose. (Use an a e tract of land involved.	additional sheet if necessary)	
X. SIGNATURE OF ATTOR	NEY (OR PRO PER):	Al-X	Date 5/20/11	
Notice to Counsel/Parties: or other papers as required by	The CV-71 (JS-44) C	oved by the Judicial Conference of the United	d herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of ple d States in September 1974, is required pursuant to Local Rule 3-1 ril docket sheet. (For more detailed instructions, see separate instru	1 is not
Key to Statistical codes relating t	to Social Security Cases			
Nature of Suit Co	ode Abbreviation	Substantive Statement of Cause of Actio	d	
861	HIA	All claims for health insurance benefits (M Also, include claims by hospitals, skilled n program. (42 U.S.C. 1935FF(b))	fedicare) under Title 18, Part A, of the Social Security Act, as amenursing facilities, etc., for certification as providers of services under	ended. der the
862	BL	All claims for "Black Lung" benefits under (30 U.S.C. 923)	r Title 4, Part B, of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of	of 1969.
863	DIWC	All claims filed by insured workers for disa amended; plus all claims filed for child's in	ability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, nsurance benefits based on disability. (42 U.S.C. 405(g))	, as
863	DIWW	All claims filed for widows or widowers in Act, as amended. (42 U.S.C. 405(g))	surance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Se	ecurity
864	SSID	All claims for supplemental security incom Security Act, as amended.	ne payments based upon disability filed under Title 16 of the Socie	al
865	RSI	All claims for retirement (old age) and surv U.S.C. (g))	vivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amende	ed. (42